



Formal methods for attack detection in autonomous driving systems: the FORESEEN project

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
PURPOSE AND GOALS

- Enhancing security of connected autonomous vehicles (CAV) by developing run-time local monitors for attack detection: the case of vehicle platoon
- Model-based design security analysis
- Traces analyses for anomaly detection
- Model checking & abstract interpretation to identify patterns suggesting the possibility of an impending attack

MOTIVATIONS

VULNERABILITY IN VEHICLE ECOSYSTEMS

- GPS spoofing attack
- On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) hacking
- Actuator controlled by malicious sw
- Attack on CAN bus (Injection/Capture)
- V2I hacking
- V2V hacking
- Man-in-the-Middle attack
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
PLATOONING APPLICATION

VEHICLE TO VEHICLE

- Vehicle to vehicle broadcast communication
- Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) law on-board of the vehicle


VEHICLE TO EDGE

- Vehicle communications through mobile network
- Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) law on the edge node



BACKGROUND

CO-SIMULATION



INTO-CPS application
<http://into-cps.org>


Co-simulate heterogeneous subsystems: vehicle dynamics, control and communication network

Maurizio Palmieri, Christian Quadri, Adriano Fagiolini, Cinzia Bernardeshi. *Co-simulated digital twin on the network edge: A vehicle platoon*. Computer Communications, vol. 212, pp. 35-47, 2023

Model-based attack injection and security analysis

Cinzia Bernardeshi, Andrea Domenici, Maurizio Palmieri. *Formalization and co-simulation of attacks on cyber-physical systems*. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, vol. 16, pp. 63-77, 2020

FORMAL METHODS




Automated verification of temporal logic formulae on system's model expressed as an automaton

Cinzia Bernardeshi, Andrea Domenici, Francesco Mercaldo, Antonella Santone. *Identify Potential Attacks from Simulated Log Analysis*. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2020: pp. 1-6, 2020

CONTRIBUTION

The methodology



- Simulation of an autonomous system of vehicles employing co-simulation and collection of simulation traces in the absence and presence of attacks. The **Design Exploration Tool** for generation of multiple simulations is exploited ("CPS Co-simulation with and without attacks (DSE)" activity)
- Generation of formal models for traces, in terms of a process algebra language ("Formal Method generator" activity)
- Detection of attacks using model checking technique ("Attack properties definition" activity)
- Identification of trace segments characteristic of attacks that can be used for on-line monitoring ("Formal classifier" activity)
- Using abstract interpretation techniques to quantify the robustness of the analysis ("Abstract Interpretation" and "Results validation" activities)

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